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Chapter 5
The Double Failure of ‘Double Effect’
Neil Roughley
The ‘doctrine of double effect’ claims that it is in some sense morally 
less problematic to bring about a negatively evaluated state of affairs as 
a ‘side effect’ of one’s pursuit of another, morally unobjectionable aim 
than it is to bring it about in order to achieve that aim. In a first step, this 
chapter discusses the descriptive difference on which the claim is built. 
That difference is shown to derive from the attitudinal distinction between 
intention and ‘acceptance’, a distinction that is in turn claimed to ground 
in a feature of the decisions that generate the attitudes in question. The 
resulting analysis is then plugged into two different normative principles 
that may each be thought to specify the intuitions behind the doctrine 
of double effect, but which have frequently been conflated. The first 
concerns the permissibility of bringing about the merely accepted state of 
affairs, the second its reduced attributability. It is argued that examination 
of the intuitions behind the two principles supports neither version of the 
doctrine. Rather, the intuitions are best captured in an attribution principle 
based on subjective probabilities and a principle of attitude evaluation, 
neither of which make explicit reference to the attitude of intending.
In the 1950s Elisabeth Anscombe claimed that there could be no substantial progress 
in moral philosophy until clarity had been established on the central concepts of 
philosophical psychology, in particular on the concept of intention (Anscombe 1958, 
26). she believed that establishing such clarity would reveal much of modern moral 
philosophy, in particular utilitarianism, to be built on shaky attitudinal foundations 
and the Catholic ‘doctrine of double effect’, in contrast, to be well founded (Anscombe 
1961, 58–9; 1982, 23–4). This chapter will illustrate one way in which Anscombe’s 
first claim is on the right lines: moral theory cannot get by without clarity on a whole 
set of issues that belong to philosophical psychology or action theory. Moreover, one 
such issue does indeed have consequences for the ‘doctrine of double effect’ and the 
intuitions it attempts to channel. however, I will be arguing against Anscombe that 
a precise understanding of the nature of intention reveals the doctrine to be without 
attitudinal foundation.
The discussion takes place in five steps. It begins by examining the form the 
doctrine is officially given within contemporary Catholic moral theology. The 
action theoretic resolution of a number of confusions and ambiguities permits 
the identification of a core normative claim. According to this claim, a particular 
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distinction in philosophical psychology is of such significance that it grounds an 
important difference in the moral evaluation of actions. The second step advocates 
a specific understanding of the relevant attitudinal distinction, between intending 
and ‘accepting’, an understanding provided by what I call the ‘upstream theory 
of intention’. Having clarified the principle’s psychological basis, the discussion 
then, thirdly, goes on to distinguish two ways in which the attitudinal distinction 
may be thought to be normatively significant, two forms of normative significance 
that have frequently been conflated by advocates of the doctrine. These are best 
articulated in two distinct principles. Sections four and five of the chapter discuss 
whether the psychological distinction can play either of the roles that it is assigned 
by the two principles. My answer will be negative. Nevertheless, I hope to show 
that a combination of attention to the psychological basis of the principle and 
careful consideration of its possible function in the structure of moral evaluation can 
disentangle the valid intuitions that are mistakenly thought to support it.
1. from the doctrine of double effect to the principle of collateral consequences
The so-called doctrine of double effect has been most frequently discussed in 
the context of ‘applied ethics’. In these discussions pairs of similar examples are 
juxtaposed in order to mobilize intuitions that the minimal descriptive difference 
between the cases grounds an important moral difference. Three such repeatedly 
discussed cases are the following:
(i) Analgesia/euthanasia
 A doctor administers a dose of morphine in order to relieve pain, knowing 
that it will kill the suffering patient in the process. This is contrasted with an 
otherwise identical deliberate mercy killing by the same means.
(ii)  Hysterectomy/abortion
 A doctor saves the life of a pregnant woman, in the first case, by removing her 
cancerous womb, thus also killing the foetus, in the second case, by crushing 
the skull of the foetus trapped in the birth canal. 
(iii)  Disarmamentbombing/demoralizationbombing
 Bombs are dropped on a munitions depot, in spite of the deaths of children in a 
nearby school this will inevitably cause; in the second, behaviourally identical 
case, the target is chosen in order to kill the children and thus demoralize the 
enemy.1 
1  For an early critical discussion of (i), see hart 1968, 122–5. More recent discussions 
include powers 1995, 341f. and Frey 2003, 465f. Example (ii) is given prominence in Jonathon 
Bennett’s Tanner Lectures on Human Values (1981), 106–9; Davis 1984, 109–16; Quinn 
1989, 336–47 and Connell 2003, 880f. Bennett’s third TannerLecture focuses primarily on 
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In each of these pairings there is a descriptive difference between the two cases that 
grounds in the way in which the agents view the dual results of their behaviour. put 
succinctly, in each of the former examples, the death brought about by the agent is 
an event he views as a ‘mere side effect’ of his action; in each of the latter examples 
it is an effect he aims to bring about in order to achieve some further goal: relieving 
the patient’s pain, saving the woman’s life, bringing the war to an end. That there 
is some such descriptive distinction to be drawn here seems clear. The ‘doctrine 
of double effect’ makes two claims about cases in which that difference is given. 
First, it claims that it is morally permissible to cause death as a ‘mere side effect’ in 
the pairings just described. second, it offers a set of conditions whose satisfaction 
it claims is necessary and sufficient for permissibility in these kinds of cases. The 
conditions can be thought of both as specifying what we should understand by ‘side 
effects’ and as adding further conditions under which the descriptive difference thus 
made renders the agent’s behaviour permissible.
According to the NewCatholicEncyclopedia, there are four such conditions that 
have to be met conjunctively:
1) “The act itself” is either morally good or indifferent.
2) The bad effect is not “positively willed”, but “merely permitted”.
3) The bad effect is not a “means” to the good or indifferent end, i.e. the good 
or indifferent effect is “produced directly” by “the action”, not by the bad 
effect.
4) There is a degree of proportionality, the good effect “compensating for” the 
bad one.2 
Condition (4), according to which bad effects should only be considered allowable 
where they are compensated for by good effects, is uncontroversial. however, 
each of the other three conditions raises conceptual questions to which we need 
answers in order to isolate the claim at the heart of the doctrine that merits serious 
consideration.
1.1On(1):“theactitself”and“doubleeffect”
If we take literally talk of “double effect”, then the two events that are up for 
comparative moral evaluation ought both to be caused by the agent’s action. At first 
glance it might appear that it is this action that is designated by the phrase “the 
act itself”. In (i) that would appear to be the injection of morphine and in (iii) the 
dropping of the bombs. Example (ii) pairs two different actions on the part of the 
(iii) (1981, 95–116). Anscombe and Finnis both use the doctrine of double effect as a standard 
for the criticism of the “obliteration bombing” of cities, particularly as practised by the allies 
in the second World War. see Anscombe 1961, 59 and Finnis 1991, 42f. The case also features 
in Powers 1995, 345–8; Quinn 1989, 336–47 and in Michael Bratman’s application of his 
analysis of intention to the doctrine in Bratman 1987, 139–64.
2  Connell 2003, 880. I have given the conditions a slight pruning. In particular, I have 
left out the distinction between “the order of causality” and “the order of time”, by means of 
which the author attempts to clarify the notion of “means” employed in condition (3).
Lumer.indb   93 11/07/2007   14:51:01
Intentionality,DeliberationandAutonomy94
doctor. In the first of these it is the hysterectomy that has the two morally competing 
effects; in the second we seem constrained to pick out the mere bodily movements 
of the doctor – his ‘basic action’ – if we want to separate his action from the death 
of the foetus as well as from the woman’s survival. Construing things in this way 
would, however, make condition (1) redundant: actions under these descriptions are 
all morally neutral; ‘basic actions’ would seem to be necessarily so. Interpretative 
charity, therefore, demands a different construal. What the phrase “the act itself” 
is presumably meant to isolate is the action under the description provided by the 
content of the agent’s intention. In other words, it is the content of the agent’s 
intention that has to be either morally good or at least indifferent.
This has two consequences: first, the two ‘effects’ at issue here are not caused 
by the ‘act itself’. Rather, the description that bequeaths us ‘the act itself’ is just 
the description of the agent’s behaviour as the cause of one of the ‘effects’, that 
effect that is morally good or indifferent. What, then, are the two ‘effects’ effects 
of? If they are indeed effects, then they will both be caused by some ‘basic action’ 
– an action characterized in a way that makes it clear that it was not performed by 
performing any other action. However, as a bit of rudimentary action theory makes 
clear, the relationship between ‘basic actions’ and the events that make broader 
action descriptions true need not be causal. For instance, doing something that 
alerts someone to a danger and thus saves her life may also countasan insult or as 
breaking a promise. In such cases, we do not have two effects, but rather two results 
or consequences, one of which is an effect, the other of which is not. For this reason, 
we are dealing, strictly, with a principle that concerns consequences or results, not 
necessarily effects. This is also a reason to avoid the everyday talk of ‘side effects’. 
Picking up the term beloved of certain military leaders, I shall instead talk here of 
collateralconsequences.
The claim that the moral status of an action depends significantly on whether the 
content of the agent’s intention was morally good or indifferent may, secondly, seem 
to leave the advocate of the doctrine open to an objection that pascal raised against 
its use by the Jesuits. According to pascal, the permissibility of just about any action 
might appear obtainable by an agent’s merely redirecting her intention.3 This is 
indeed a problem in certain cases that have been seen as providing applications of 
the doctrine. Example (ii) is a case in point: what is supposed to be the criterion for 
claiming that it is the second doctor’s intention to kill the foetus, rather than simply to 
crush its skull? On the one hand, the causal connection between the realization of the 
latter intention and the former effect cannot be sufficient, otherwise the doctrinaire 
would also have to lumber the first doctor with the intention to kill the foetus. On 
the other hand, the problem is not solved by insisting on a conceptual connection, as 
there is little plausibility to the claim that skull crushing entails killing.4
3  Kenny 1973, 140f. A similar suspicion has been reiterated by John harris, who has 
claimed that where permissibility or responsibility is at issue, “intention can be so narrowly 
defined as to yield any answer that is wanted”. See Harris 1980, 50.
4  This is the problem of ‘closeness’. On this point see Bennett 1981, 107–13; Anscombe 
1982, 22f.; Davis 1984, 111–13; Quinn 1989, 336–41.
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Nevertheless, other cases, for instance examples (i) and (iii), look to pose no real 
problem as to which consequence is intended and which is not. Rather, the obstetrics/
abortion case seems simply to be a dubious application of the doctrine. In order to 
be clear on whether this is correct, that is, on whether identifying the contents of a 
person’s intentions is indeed less criterially wobbly than pascal assumed, we will 
need an analysis of the concept of intention.
1.2On(2):“positivewilling”and“permitting”
Condition (2) offers an attitudinal explanation of the notion of collateral consequences, 
which the negatively evaluated event has to instantiate: collateral consequences 
are not “positively willed” but “merely permitted”. A word is in order about both 
expressions.
To begin with, the concepts of intention or aiming are to be preferred to the former, 
not only because they are more firmly grounded in everyday usage, but because 
talk of ‘positive willing’ as opposed to ‘permitting’ may encourage a confusion 
of the doctrine with a further controversial normative principle often cited by 
‘deontologists’. This is the claim that there is an important moral difference between 
acting to make some proposition the case and allowing it to become or continue 
to be the case. The important point for our purposes is that this latter difference is 
orthogonal to the distinction which the ‘doctrine of double effect’ claims is of moral 
significance. A person’s non-action can, like her action, result from her intending 
to behave the way she does in order that some result may come about. similarly, 
either an action or an omission can be performed in the face of the belief that that 
‘performance’ will lead to some collateral consequences.
Talk of ‘positive willing’ thus should be replaced by talk of ‘intending’ or 
‘aiming’. However, although the term ‘permitting’ can be equally misleading, there 
is also something felicitous about it. If we keep in mind that talk of ‘permitting’ refers 
to a particular kind of attitude and not to a specifically non-active way of realizing 
an attitude, then it is certainly more appropriate than another characterization one 
frequently finds here, namely that of “merely foreseeing”. Contrasting the action-
guiding concept of intention with the merely epistemic notion of foreseeing is an 
unhelpful move because it appears to situate the objects of the latter attitude outside 
‘the action itself’. however, things are attitudinally more complicated. A minimally 
rational agent who intends to A in order to bring about p, whilst recognizing that doing 
so will (probably) also bring about q, cannot simply maintain a purely epistemic 
perspective towards her (basic) action’s having these consequences.
If Gill knocks back a number of gins in order to get drunk, knowing that she is 
also risking an awful hangover, she must, in so far as she is minimally rational, be 
accepting that risk. Accepting a proposition is a species of opting for it, as is intending 
to bring it about. Both attitudes, one could say, are optative, being expressible by 
the locution “Let it be the case that p”. Of course, under other circumstances Gill 
would not opt for the splitting headache she knows she is risking. But under other 
circumstances she would not opt to get drunk either. Such counterfactuals only tell 
us something about counterfactual opting; they do not change what the agent has 
opted for in the circumstances given. Agents such as Gill, like the agents in examples 
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(i) to (iii), opt strictly for what Gilbert Harman has aptly termed a “total package” 
(harman 1986, 98; cf. Bratman 1987, 143), that is for a conjunctive state of affairs 
(p and q). One of the conjoins is aimed at, the other only accepted. The ‘doctrine of 
double effect’ tells us that in spite of the fact that both propositions are conjunctively 
opted for, the fact that one is only accepted, whereas the other is aimed at or intended, 
makes a significant normative difference.
An adequate discussion of the doctrine thus needs to take account of two 
attitudinal facts: one, that both sets of consequences are opted for in the circumstances 
and, two, that we nevertheless distinguish between the proposition aimed at and the 
proposition merely accepted. In order to work out whether a significant normative 
difference can really be built on this attitudinal distinction, we need an analysis that 
clarifies what it is about intending or aiming that distinguishes it from acceptance. 
This task is taken up in section 2.
1.3On(3):“means”
If the first two conditions are given the suggested interpretations, then they provide 
a simple and coherent core doctrine, according to which there is some kind of 
significant normative difference between, on the one hand, bringing about some 
state of affairs because one aims to bring it about and, on the other hand, bringing 
it about because one accepts it in the light of its consequential relation to a state of 
affairs one aims to bring about. I shall call a slightly specified version of this core 
claim the principleofcollateralconsequences (pCC).
In the light of this characterization, it is not immediately clear what role the third 
condition is supposed to play. According to the most natural reading, it would appear 
to pick out a particularly salient case of the second condition: if (2) excludes the bad 
action being intended, (3) may simply seem to specify that it may not be intended as 
a means. We can say that taking some action A one is performing to be a means to 
some other action B involves A–ing because one intends to A, where the intention to 
A results from one’s belief that A–ing is an antecedentcausalcondition of one’s B–
ing. A great number of our intentions come into being because we believe that, as a 
result of the causal structure of our environment, we can only achieve something else 
we intend by first A–ing. However, the reasons I gave for talking of ‘consequences’ 
rather than of ‘effects’ ought to make it clear that the causal relation cannot be what 
is normatively decisive. If breaking a promise is forbidden, but one can only help 
someone in need by deliberately doing something that counts as breaking a promise, 
then surely an advocate of the doctrine ought to find the behaviour of the promise 
breaker morally problematic in the same way that she takes causing physical harm 
as a means to helping to be morally problematic. Taking the bringing about of some 
morally problematic state of affairs to be a means or a way of bringing about a 
morally good or indifferent state of affairs ought, if the pCC is indeed the core of the 
doctrine, both involve the same kind of norm contravention.
Taken literally, however, condition (3) is not just a specification of a particular 
kind of reason for intending to bring about some bad state of affairs. As it stands, the 
condition does not stipulate that the bad ‘consequence’ not be takenas a means, that 
is, intended because it is believed to be an antecedent causal condition of the agent’s 
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aim. What it stipulates is that the bad effect not be a means. In other words, condition 
(3) is a purely causal matter, that is, a condition on the way the relevant events in the 
world relate to each other, not a requirement on the conception of those events on 
the part of the agent.5 Thus understood, a ‘means’ is an antecedent causal condition, 
irrespective of whether anyone knows this or not. Taken together with condition 
(2), we would now have the requirement that the bringing about of some negatively 
evaluated state of affairs neither be intended, for instance taken to be a means, nor 
be an antecedent causal condition of a positively evaluated end. 
Note that as a purely extensional condition it would apply even if the negatively 
evaluated state of affairs should, contrarytowhattheagentthought, turn out to be 
an antecedent causal condition of the positively evaluated state of affairs. Think 
of the bombing example: in bombing the munitions depot, the collateral bomber 
accepts the deaths of the children because he sees the destruction of the arms depot 
as a means to bring the war to a speedy end. Imagine, however, that the enemy 
ends up surrendering, but only because of the deaths of the children, in spite of 
the fact that this was not the collateral bomber’s plan. Extensionally understood, 
the deaths of the children turn out to be a means to the end of shortening the war. 
According to condition (3), that makes dropping the bomb impermissible, whatever 
happened to be going through the pilot’s mind. Notice that this construction has 
the bizarre conclusion that the good outcome, the end of the war, makes the action 
impermissible, whereas the bomb dropping and the children’s consequent deaths 
would have been permissible if the entire action had turned out to be completely 
ineffectual.
As an extensional reading of condition (3) would render it an absurd requirement,6 
it is therefore most reasonable to read it intensionally. But, as that is to see it as 
merely picking out the most salient type of case already covered by (2), the condition 
can simply be dropped.
1.4Abstractingfromabsolutism
There is one final feature of the ‘doctrine of double effect’ which should be 
mentioned and which should be recognized as extraneous to the core claim of the 
pCC. It is not explicitly stated in the four conditions, but presupposed in the claim 
that their satisfaction is necessary in order that certain actions may be permitted. The 
presupposition is that morality includes absolute prohibitions, that is, that it forbids 
certain actions, whatever competing reasons may be adduced for performing the 
action in the circumstances. Expressed in the language of means and ends: “there 
5  On the ambiguity between extensional and intensional readings of the third condition, 
see Davis 1984, 114–16.
6  The article in the NewCatholicEncyclopedia, on which I have based my own wording, 
suggests primarily an extensional interpretation. however, the formulation of Joannes p. 
Gury in his Compendium TheologiaeMoralis (1850/1874), which, according to Mangan, 
provides the canonical version of all four conditions, is clearly meant to be intensional. Gury’s 
explanation of the requirement “The evil effect must not be the means to the good effect” is 
that, if it were, “then the good [would be] sought by willing the evil” (my emphasis). See 
Mangan 1949, 59–61.
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are no ends which justify every means, and … there are some means which no end 
will justify” (Kenny 1995, 87). The function that the doctrine is supposed to fulfil 
can be made particularly clear by examining its role in absolutism. The absolutist 
presupposition is that certain actions, pre-eminent among which is killing, can under 
no circumstances ever be justified. However, as there can frequently be situations in 
which these absolute prohibitions would lead to undesirable normative paralysis, a 
principle that makes certain of their contraventions non-reproachable, inspiteofnot
being justified, can save the absolutist from the predicament of having frequently to 
condemn agents whatever they do.7
Although this is one explanation of the attraction of the doctrine, it clearly cannot 
constitute its rationale. For one thing, it makes the doctrine’s plausibility depend 
on the validity of absolutism. Most important, the doctrine’s capacity to loosen 
absolutism’s hold depends itself on the independent plausibility of the pCC, that is, 
on the claim that the distinction between intending and merely accepting makes a 
decisive normative difference where we are evaluating actions. But if this attitudinal 
distinction really is able to fulfil this function in the case of absolute prohibitions, 
then it should result in the same sort of normative relaxation relative to non-
absolute prohibitions, that is, with respect to prohibitions that can also, under other 
circumstances, be outweighed by stronger justifying reasons. It should thus make 
itself felt relative to norms that have no more than protantocharacter, for instance, 
the norm not to cause pain. Recent secular advocates of the doctrine, prominent 
among whom is Thomas Nagel, argue that precisely this is the case (cf. Nagel 1986, 
176). An example pairing that illustrates the point can be provided by a couple of 
dentists, one of whom sees the pain he is inflicting as a side effect of his drilling, 
whereas his twin inflicts the same amount of pain in the course of the same operation 
on purpose. It seems clear that the attitudinal difference between the two dentists 
gives rise to exactly the same intuitions about the normative difference between 
the two cases, as do the attitudinal differences in examples (i) and (iii). For this 
reason, we not only can but should detach the core of the doctrine, that is, the pCC, 
from absolutism. The pCC’s plausibility does not depend on absolutism; rather, any 
plausibility absolutism is thought to have may very well depend on the validity of 
the PCC, without which the lack of a mechanism for restricting the dilemmas to 
which absolutism gives rise is likely to appear intolerable.8
1.5Twoquestions
This preliminary analysis shows that the ‘doctrine of double effect’ depends on the 
core claim I have labelled the ‘principle of collateral consequences’. According 
to the pCC, accepting rather thanaimingat some negatively evaluated p one is 
7  Cf. Anscombe 1982, 19–22; Mackie 1977, 161f. The reason for the particular 
concentration on killing in the Catholic tradition is that the causation of death can result from 
deeds with other aims, whereas the contravention of other absolute norms – Anscombe names 
the prohibition of “sodomy” (!) – are hardly possible without corresponding intentions.
8  The other candidate for a dilemma-restricting mechanism is the doctrine of a normative 
distinction between doing and allowing.
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bringing about brings with it some kind of normativerelaxationoftheprohibition 
on the action of bringing about p. If this is correct, then an investigation of the 
doctrine has two questions to answer. The first concerns the precise character of 
the descriptive difference between the two attitudes that is claimed to justify the 
normative relaxation. Only if we are clear what it is about intending that goes 
beyond accepting can we come to understand the idea that its absence might explain 
the peculiar normative relaxation of a prohibition that is supposed to result from 
that absence. The second question concerns the normative relaxation itself. How 
precisely are we to understand the idea of the normative relaxation of a prohibition 
where that prohibition is not cancelled by stronger counter-reasons? I shall argue 
that distinct intuitions feed into this idea. These, it seems, need to be taken apart and 
discussed separately in order for us to be able to appreciate their force. Note that 
there is nothing in the ‘doctrine of double effect’ that explains why its core principle 
is supposed to be valid. Anyone who accepts the principle ought to do so because she 
accepts its rationale or, at the very least, accepts an explanation of why no rationale 
of the principle can be provided. Let us begin with the first question.
2. Intending, aiming and accepting
How, then, is the attitudinal distinction that grounds the idea of collateral consequences 
to be analysed?
2.1Commitmentandirreducibility
The first step towards an answer consists in clarifying what it is that distinguishes 
intending from other optative attitudes, that is, wants in the general sense of pro-
attitudes explicable by locutions of the form “Let it be the case that p”. In the literature 
on intending, the central feature invoked here is that of commitment to bringing about 
the attitude’s content (harman 1986, 94f.; Bratman 1987, 4f., 16–20, 107–10; Mele 
1992, 158–62). Commitment to some action goes beyond merely wanting to perform 
it, even where one believes oneself capable of performing it. The majority opinion 
on this component at the moment is that it is in some sense irreducible to beliefs 
and wants, even where the latter are supplemented by motivational specifications. 
Commitment to perform an action is something other than being most strongly 
motivated to do it, with or without supplementary doxastic conditions (Brand 1984, 
123–7; harman 1986, 78–95; Bratman 1987, 10, 100, 121; Mele 1992, 154–70; 
2003, 28).
Now, an irreducibility claim is a claim that there is, for some reason, a point 
beyond which analysis is impossible. Were this to be the case with the commitment 
component of intention, then it might appear that the descriptive mystery facing us 
here grounds the normative mystery that is the unjustified normative relaxation of a 
prohibition. Commitment, so it might be thought, is just something special and when 
it is absent from the causation of certain consequences, then we should relax those 
normative strictures that only come into play where the commitment component 
essential to intention is at work. Adapting a move central to Michael Bratman’s 
Lumer.indb   99 11/07/2007   14:51:02
Intentionality,DeliberationandAutonomy100
normative functionalist theory of intention, someone might argue that one of the 
functional roles definitive of commitment is precisely its requirement if moral norms 
relative to an agent’s action are to be strictly applicable. According to Bratman, 
commitment is partly defined by its normative role, although in his conception the 
relevant role is one within norms of prudential rationality, not morality: someone 
who intends to do something ought to deliberate so as to form subordinate intentions, 
refrain from forming conflicting intentions and endeavour to bring about the 
intention’s content (Bratman 1987, 16–18; 140–41). What makes Bratman’s theory 
irreducibilist is the idea that intention, in particular its commitment component, is in 
part defined as whatever attitudinal feature it is that makes it rational for its bearer to 
adhere to such practical norms. This strategy leaves open a question that one would 
certainly like a theory of intention to answer: namely, invirtueofwhat does being 
‘committed’ to some action make it rational to adhere to those norms? Normative 
functionalism effectively tells us that this question cannot be answered. An adherent 
of the PCC might very well respond in a parallel manner to the question as to what it 
is about intending in virtue of which norms contravened in its absence suffer a kind 
of normative debilitation: the question just cannot be answered. Nevertheless, part 
of intending’s essence, so it might seem, is visible in the normative role it plays in 
morality, as expressed in the pCC.
What is important here is not that an advocate of the doctrine might see the role of 
intention in the PCC as part-definitive of intention, but the fact that an irreducibilist 
conception of intending confers plausibility on the principle. Our inability to provide 
an analysis of intention in descriptive terms would explain why we are unable to 
say with any clarity what it is about intention that explains its particular normative 
role in morality. For this reason a discussion of the PCC requires a discussion of the 
irreducibility thesis.
The obvious way to challenge an irreducibility thesis is to offer an analysis of 
the concept in question. The general line an analysis of intention should take seems 
to involve focusing criterially not on the characteristic normative or motivational 
results, but on the genetic conditions of its instantiation. schematically put: we 
should be looking not downstream, but upstream.9 Briefly, the optative attitudes we 
primarily pick out by means of the term ‘intention’ are, quite simply, the products 
of decisions. Alongside these primary intentions there is a second set of wants 
picked out by the term, namely spontaneously generated wants that are qualified by 
sufficient motivational strength for them to directly control unreflective action. The 
idea of commitment that gives rise to characteristic motivational consequences and 
grounds norms of prudential rationality is, according to such an analysis, bipartite.10 
In our context, however, for reasons to be mentioned in a moment, we can focus 
entirely on the first, paradigmatic sort of intention.
If this is correct, then the criteria we require here are going to be criteria for the 
concept of decision. Decisions are optative stands that bring to a close episodes of 
what can be called ‘minimal practical deliberation’. Minimal practical deliberation 
9  This symmetry in the accounts thus characterized was pointed out by Michael 
Bratman. The account that I offer is argued for in detail in Roughley (forthcoming).
10  In this point I agree with David Velleman (cf. Velleman 1989, 112).
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is the mental process set in motion by the desire of the agent to resolve an optative 
uncertainty as to what to do. Deliberation that is more than minimal, as it usually 
is, involves the weighing of pro- and contra-considerations with the same end in 
view, but the resolution of optative uncertainty that is definitive of deciding is not 
tied to the prior weighing of reasons. sometimes we ‘just decide’. But whatever it 
is that leads an agent to take that particular stand, her paradigmatic intentions are 
those optative attitudes distinguished by having terminated optative uncertainty and 
the (minimal) practical deliberation she initiated in order to do so. According to this 
perspective, it is our having decided to A that tends to motivate us to make further 
attitudinal moves to ensure that we A and which makes it rational to do so.
2.2Optingforapackage
Returning to the specific kinds of examples that are relevant for the PCC, it ought 
to be clear why only decisional intentions are relevant: opting for a conjunctive 
package, the conjoins of which have been weighed against each other, is obviously 
a postdeliberative matter. For this reason we can ignore secondary, spontaneously 
formed intentions. however, the fact that, in the cases we are concerned with, the 
agent decides to realize a complex proposition only one conjoin of which is aimed 
at would appear to throw doubts on the genetic analysis: if deciding to bring about p 
is definitive of intending to bring about p, then that seems to make an agent in such 
a case intend to bring about both consequences of his action. This would appear to 
deny the descriptive premise on which the pCC is built, a premise I have claimed is 
enshrined in everyday psychology. If the genetic analysis really does force us to this 
conclusion, then we should surely reject it. 
Bratman rejects such an analysis because of what he sees as the falsity of the 
“choice-intention principle”, according to which choosing to do A and B necessarily 
involves intending to A and to B (Bratman 1987, 145). The principle, Bratman 
argues, is false because choosing a package does not commit one to forming further 
intentions conducive to the realization of both conjoins and to endeavouring to 
realize both. Rather, these characteristic downstream roles of intending only need 
come into play with respect to one of the conjoins. If the other is only accepted, then 
nothing of the sort need be true of it (ibid., 154f.).
The upstreamist reply to this is to insist on a clear distinction between the agent’s 
attitude to the package and his attitude to its components. It is true that choosing or 
deciding to (A and B) does not necessarily involve intending to A and intending to B. 
What it does necessarily involve, the upstreamist claims, is intending to (A and B). 
This is because we do not have to intend singularly to bring about every consequence 
we take it we will be bringing about when we realize a package we intend to realize. 
Bratman’s arguments against this claim beg the question. The collateral bomber, he 
argues, does not intend to kill the children even as part of a conjunctive intention 
because he is not disposed to reason about how to kill them or to endeavour to kill 
them should doing so be separable from the destruction of the munitions depot (ibid., 
148).11 But were such separability to be possible, then the bomber could drop the 
11  This is his argument against what he calls “the principle of intention division”.
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conjunctive intention. He only intends the package because of what he takes to be 
the inseparability of the conjoins.12 Given that they cannot be taken apart, he intends 
both of them together.
2.3Aiming
This defence of the upstream analysis has only so far shown why downstreamist 
arguments do not falsify the claim that paradigmatic intentions concern what the 
agent has decided to do. It has done nothing to solve the problem we set out to 
solve, namely how to distinguish between what is individually intended and what 
is individually accepted within the content of a complex intention. how can the 
upstreamist make sense of this distinction?
The answer involves saying something more about the agent’s view of the 
relationship between the proposition aimed at and the overall package. The point 
is simply this: an agent intends to bring about that singular state of affairs as part 
of a conjunctively intended package the prospect of which she takes to provide the
reasonfor her decision to go for the whole package.13 Where she opts for (pand q), 
she intends or aims to bring about p and not q if she sees her overall stand as justified 
in the light of the prospect of bringing about p.
It is important to note that this relationship between aiming and accepting within 
an intended package is by no means exclusive to intention. It is, on the contrary, a 
perfectly general phenomenon in the optative sphere and is, for instance, to be found 
in cases of wanting where no action on the part of the want’s bearer is at issue. Take 
the case of polly, who is observing with interest the political developments in some 
far-off country. she considers the possible outcomes of approaching elections there. 
In doing so she acquires the want that the x-party win the election because she believes 
their economic policy is the one most likely to put an end to the country’s poverty. 
however, this want is not formed wholeheartedly, because polly also believes that the 
x-party will implement certain forms of unpalatable social repression. Nevertheless, 
compared with the alternatives on offer, she certainly wants the x-party to win.
This is an optative package deal scenario, in which the relevant attitudes are 
non-action wants. We would normally describe polly’s optative state as one in which 
she hopes that the x-party wins. In doing so she accepts that this outcome will bring 
with it certain forms of repression to which she is averse. The decisive point of 
comparison is that Polly’s acceptance of the unpalatable consequences does not lead 
us to ascribe to her the hope that they take place. Note further that the optative terms 
of which this is true can be extended. If polly happens to believe that a victory of the 
x-party is a certainty, then we might say that she islookingforwardto their winning 
the election. But we would not say that she is looking forward to them carrying 
out the repressive measures she takes to be unavoidable. Note finally that we can 
also reverse the polarities: take someone who is, on balance, afraidof the package 
deal being offered by his rapidly approaching old age. Although he can also see 
12  Cf. my remarks about counterfactual opting under 1.2.
13  Cf. Scanlon’s proposal: “one’s intention … is an aspect of one’s action that is crucial 
to the reason one takes oneself to have to do it.” See Scanlon 2000, 306f.
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certain benefits that it may bring, he is not for that reason afraid of those prospective 
benefits. Where someone desires singularly the consequences of the prospect that 
furnishes the reason for a package deal she opts for, we can say that she welcomes 
them. Welcoming is the positive variant of acceptance.
In all these cases, some proposition is the content of what one might call a ‘focal 
optative stand’: a singular want the content of which furnishes the reason for the 
overall optative stand on the package deal. In the case of effective intentions, it 
will also be the reason for which the agent acts. In the case of such intentions, we 
can say both metaphorically and literally, it furnishes the decisivereason: it is the 
consideration that makes the difference and the consideration on the basis of which 
the agent takes his decision. The relationship between aiming and accepting, then, 
involves a taking-as-justifying on the part of the agent. This will turn out to be 
important as we turn to the way in which the normative relaxation specified by the 
PCC is supposed to work.
3. Two versions of the principle of collateral consequences
In order to clarify the form of normative relaxation that might plausibly supervene 
on the descriptive distinction, there is a distinction between types of normative 
principles that need to be made explicit. This is necessary because of an ambiguity in 
the intuitions that are adduced in the literature to support the doctrine. The ambiguity 
can, for instance, be seen in two claims made by Thomas Nagel within a short space. 
Although the two points are clearly distinct, Nagel obviously does not think it 
necessary to distinguish them, let alone to argue for them separately.
The first is this: “Intention”, he asserts, “appears to magnify the importance of 
evil aims by comparison with evil side effects”; intended evil is “lit up” by the 
“intensifying beam” of intention (Nagel 1986, 180f.). The claim behind these 
metaphors seems to be that the bringing about of a negatively evaluated state of 
affairs as a result of an intention constitutes a worseoffence than doing so as a result 
of a mere acceptance. In other words, this is the de-absolutized variant of the original 
Catholic doctrine, according to which the latter may well be permitted where the 
former is forbidden. Now compare Nagel’s second claim: according to this, “we 
consider ourselves farmore responsible for what we do (or permit) intentionally 
than for consequences of action that we foresee and decide to accept but that do not 
form part of our aims” (ibid., 180, my emphasis). This is a different matter and can 
be rephrased in the following way: where it is forbidden to bring about a certain 
state of affairs, the fact that someone brings it about as the result of an acceptance, 
rather than an intention, makes doing so in an important sense less fully the agent’s 
action and thus exculpates him, at least to some degree, from having contravened the 
relevant norm.14 here, as in many other discussions of the doctrine, it appears that 
intuitions as to the principles of assignment of responsibility for the contravention 
of norms contribute to the plausibility of a claim about the contents of the norms 
14  Timothy Chappell sees this latter claim as the core of the doctrine of double effect 
(Chappell 2002, 223–5). David Chan also sees (his version of) the doctrine as a principle for 
the evaluation of the blameworthiness of agents (Chan 2000, 405–34).
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contravened. But these are two different claims and we can only attain clarity on 
the strength of reasons that thus cluster around the cases in question if we take them 
apart.
The ambiguity at work here derives from the failure to distinguish between two 
different kinds of principles at work in systems of moral evaluation. The first kinds 
are moral norms in the narrow sense of the word, norms whose primary function is 
to guidetheprospectiveactionofagents. Where these norms are employed in their 
secondary function, that is as standards for the retrospective evaluation of actions, 
they are complemented by principles of a second sort, principles that regulatethe
assignment of responsibility for the contravention of the norms. The fact that a 
person has violated some norm does not in itself decide the question as to how 
strongly that violation is to be attributed to her. That depends on whether there are 
further factors to be taken into account that should count as excusing her for what 
she has done. Considerations of both sorts combine to justify judgements as to the 
level of culpability of the agent: how guilty she is depends both on how important 
the norm is that she has violated and how strongly the violation is to be attributed to 
her. The two points are, however, clearly distinguishable and are distinguished by 
modern legal systems (Fletcher 2000, 454–9, 576–9).
In our context, the important point is that the moral significance of the intention/
acceptance distinction could be expressed in a principle of either sort, that is, its 
function could be thought to be either normative in the narrow sense or responsibility-
theoretic. As a result we can give the pCC two different formulations:
 pCC(N)
 Where an agent A brings about a state of affairs p the bringing about of which 
is morally problematic, p’s being merely accepted, rather than aimed at, 
necessarily counts in favour of the permissibility of A’s action token.
 pCC(R)
 Where an agent A brings about a state of affairs p the bringing about of 
which is morally prohibited, p’s being merely accepted, rather than aimed at, 
necessarily counts as reducing A’s responsibility for having contravened the 
relevant norm.
We should reject both variants. Dealing with them separately will, on the one hand, 
prevent independent intuitions from interfering with each other. That will make it 
easier to see that there are no arguments that give adequate support to either version 
of the principle. On the other hand, it will also enable us to see that there are indeed 
cogent arguments that support claims which are related to the two versions of the pCC 
in one way or another. There are, it turns out, important normative and responsibility-
theoretic principles at work in the background. However, these neither derive from 
the intention/acceptance distinction nor justify judgements that are coextensive with 
those to which either version of the pCC would commit us.
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4. Acceptance and responsibility
Let us begin with the claim that the distinction between intention and acceptance 
grounds a distinction in the assignment of responsibility.
4.1Responsibilityandcriminalhomicide
The role that the pCC(R) ascribes to the distinction can be characterized effectively 
by means of a comparison with legal practices. The Us Model penal Code, 
for instance, distinguishes what it calls four “kinds of culpability”: “purpose”, 
“knowledge”, “recklessness” and “negligence”. The Criminal Code for England and 
Wales establishes similar distinctions among “degrees of fault”, preferring to talk 
of “intention”, rather than “purpose” (American Law Institute 2001, sect. 2.02(2), 
94f.; Law Commission 1989, sect. 18, 51f.). The most important threshold in both 
systems is the one that separates recklessness on the one hand from ‘knowledge’ 
and ‘intention’ or ‘purpose’ on the other. An agent is taken to be less responsible for 
breaking a law as a result of taking an unacceptable risk of producing some result 
than for either producing it purposely or for acting in the knowledge that what she is 
doing will have such a result. In Anglo-American law, the chief difference between 
murder and manslaughter is drawn by this means (American Law Institute 2001, 
sects 210.2–3, 305–71; Law Commission 1989, sects 54–5, 66–7). The pCC(R) is 
best understood as proposing that the difference between acceptance – which covers 
‘knowledge’ – on the one hand and ‘purpose’ or ‘intention’ on the other should be 
seen as marking a responsibility threshold with a similar status.
It may appear at first glance that there are features of our legal systems that 
support this view. The definition of murder provided by the British Law Commission 
does in fact require an ‘intention’ either to cause death or to cause serious personal 
harm (Law Commission 1989, sects 54, 66–7). Certain philosophers, notably 
Anthony Kenny and John Finnis, have argued that the content of this requirement 
should be understood as the agent’s aiming at occurrences of either of those kinds, in 
the everyday sense of ‘aiming’ (Kenny 1977, 172f.; Finnis 1991, 49). however, that 
has not been the view of the British Law Lords. On the contrary, comments made by 
the Lords in various cases demonstrate that the Criminal Code’s distinction between 
‘intention’ and ‘knowledge’ is not disjunctive, indeed that the notion of ‘intention’ 
employed in the definition of murder clearly extends beyond the everyday concept.
The precise understanding of the ‘mental element’ necessary for murder has been 
the subject of considerable debate among judges and legal commentators. As has 
been repeatedly remarked (Williams 1983, 249–54; Smith and Hogan 1978, 47–
52, 285–91; Fletcher 2000, 269–74; Kenny 1977, 161–74; Duff 1990, 1–37), the 
case of Mrs hyam (1974) motivated the Lords to engage in extensive exercises of 
conceptual analysis. The defendant had poured petrol through a letter box and set 
light to it with the purpose of frightening her rival, but with the effect of killing the 
latter’s daughters. There was considerable disagreement amongst the Lords as to 
how the relevant notion of intention is precisely to be understood and as to whether 
the mental state thus identified is indeed required for murder. However, there was no 
dissent in the question as to whether theconscioustakingofacertaindegreeofriskas
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tocausingdeath could be sufficient for murder, even if death had not been aimed at. 
Two of the Lords made this point in terms of the everyday notion of intention, adding 
that either such an everyday intention or a specific degree of subjective probability 
is required. Others insisted on the necessity of an ‘intention’ in a technical sense that 
incorporates the additional doxastic criteria into the concept.15
Either way, the consensus in both British and American law is that murder 
requires either an everyday intention or the acceptance of consequences believed to 
have a certain probability. This requirement can be terminologically clothed either 
in line with this everyday distinction, as the Us Model penal Code does (American 
Law Institute 2001, sect. 210.2(1), 305), or can be specified in terms of a misleading 
technical notion of intention, as incorporated into the Criminal Code for England 
and Wales. Here an ‘intention’ is said to be in play where the agent “acts either in 
order to bring about [a result] or being aware that it will occur in the ordinary course 
of events” (Law Commission 1989, sect. 18(b)(ii), 51). The important point for our 
purposes is that, where the law does see an ‘intention’ as necessary for murder, 
the operative concept is an expanded variant of the everyday notion. To avoid 
misunderstanding, we can refer to the technical notion of intention in use here as a 
‘British legal intention’ or a blintention.16
Note that although in these cases British law builds the requirement of a blintention 
into the description of the offence – using it, for instance, to establish the primary 
distinction between murder and manslaughter – that does not entail that the object 
of the operative prohibition is killing-as-a-result-of-a-blintention, a norm that might 
be thought to exist alongside another, independent norm prohibiting killing-as-a-
result-of-recklessness. Rather, the ‘offences’ of murder and manslaughter are both 
contraventions of the same norm, but are distinguished according to the extent to 
which the agent is responsible for those contraventions. In such cases it is the degree 
of attributability that is seen as justifying differences in sentencing – a difference that 
can be minimal in England where homicide is concerned, but is considerable for the 
distinct offences of ‘intended serious personal harm’ (life imprisonment) and ‘reckless 
serious personal harm’ (five years) (Law Commission 1989, 123). These latter two 
offences are again contraventions of the same norm (causing serious personal harm), 
but are distinguished by the extent to which they are attributed to their agents. such 
offences are importantly different in structure from prohibitions whose contents are 
the bringing about of a certain level of probability of some undesirable event, as 
in the offence of ‘reckless driving’. The superficial appearance that the concept of 
recklessness has the same function in the two offences ‘reckless serious personal 
harm’ and ‘reckless driving’ is illusory. In the former its fulfilment indicates that the 
15  Even Lord Hailsham, whose ruling Kenny sees as pointing the way to a definition 
of murder that requires aiming on the part of the defendant, actually stipulated that what are 
taken to be “inseparable consequences of the end” are also ‘intended’. See Smith and Hogan 
1978, 50.
16  Whether commentators approve or disapprove, there is little dispute that we are 
dealing here with a “term of art”. See Fletcher 2000, 443; Williams 1983, 250; Finnis 1991, 
50. Blintentions are closely related to German “Vorsaetze”, which come in three grades, the 
lowest, ‘doluseventualis’ involving being ‘reconciled’ to producing the relevant harm. see 
Lackner and Kuhl 1999, sects 15, 108–24; Fletcher 2000, 446–8.
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agent was less responsible for contravening the prohibition than he would have been 
had he done so as a result of a blintention. In the second case recklessness is part of 
the content of the prohibition itself: the norm forbids a certain level of risk-taking 
whilst driving.17 Where, as in such cases, recklessness is a genuine part of the norm’s 
content, no one thinks that the activity whose reckless performance is forbidden 
(driving) is itself morally problematic and that the agent would have committed a 
worse crime if he had performed it as a result of a blintention.
4.2Controlandsubjectiveprobabilities
Unlike what first appearances may suggest, then, our legal practices do not work 
with anything comparable to a responsibility-theoretic distinction between intention 
and acceptance. Rather, the decisive threshold remains that drawn by the orthogonal 
distinction between blintention and recklessness. The distinction is orthogonal 
because it is primarily a matter of the subjective probabilities opted for.18 Of course, 
the fact that this is the way the Us and British legal systems assign responsibility 
for homicide is no proof that this is the reasonable way to view things. however, we 
do not have to look far to see why it is. The decisive point is the contribution that an 
increase in subjective probabilities, unlike the move from acceptance to intention, 
makes to the factor that grounds responsibility, namely the control exercised by the 
agent.
An agent’s control over the production of states of affairs is, as Aristotle argued, 
dependent on the two criteria of knowledge and lack of compulsion (Aristotle, NE 
1109b35–1110a1; cf. hart 1968, 121f.). On the one hand, law or morality can see 
responsibility as diminished where the agent is subject to duress, to pathologically 
compulsive inner states or where he is provoked so severely that any reasonable person 
would be expected to lose control over himself. On the other hand, an agent’s (non-
culpable) lack of knowledge of the results he is bringing about exculpates him from 
any harm he causes as a result of that ignorance. Moreover, it is equally reasonable to 
see the gradability of doxastic states as grounding degrees of culpability. Now, there 
is clearly a highly stipulative element to decisions as to where exactly thresholds are 
to be set and, indeed, as to how many such thresholds are appropriate. The important 
point here is that it is some contrast of this kind that we need, because it is the kind 
that concerns our capacities for control. The greater the probability we ascribe to 
some result of a ‘basic action’ of ours, the more we see that result as dependent on 
us and correspondingly the more we take on responsibility for bringing it about. 
This only changes once our control over the performance of the ‘basic action’ is 
diminished as a result of one or another form of compulsion. In contrast, the fact that 
the prospect of some state of affairs is notthereason for the agent deciding to bring 
17  On the relationship between norms requiring the bringing about of bare states of 
affairs and norms whose contents are the creations of probabilities of states of affairs, see 
seebass 1994, 381–97.
18  This is the primary, although not the entire basis of the distinction because liability 
is also seen as dependent on the social acceptability of the risks taken. Cf. Fletcher 2000, 
259–62.
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it about – in spite of his having it in his optative purview – is quite simply irrelevant
forthequestionofcontrol.
Although the legal distinction between blintention and recklessness is orthogonal 
to the everyday distinction between intention and acceptance, there is, nevertheless, 
a simple connection between the two that helps to explain the responsibility-
theoretic intuitions expressed in the pCC(R). This is that everyday intentions tend to 
be associated with a fairly high level of subjective probability. There is no necessity 
to this: if a person fires a machine gun at a moving car in order to bring it to a halt, 
he may be well aware that doing so makes the death of one of the passengers highly 
likely. Nevertheless, that does not entail that he intends to kill anyone. However, there 
is clearly a strong tendency for aims and high subjective probabilities to correlate.
There are two reasons why this is so. First, people only tend to aim at things 
they think there is a fair likelihood of them being able to attain, whereas there is 
no characteristic level of subjective probability a person assigns to a proposition he 
merely accepts as a possible consequence of his action. Second, there are structural 
reasons why cases in which the proposition accepted is thought to have a higher 
probability than that aimed at are going to in the minority. We can see this if we 
distinguish two kinds of example, which can be labelled ‘branching cases’ and 
‘knock-on cases’. In branchingcases an agent brings about p because doing so tends 
to bring about consequence q and in spite of the fact that bringing about p tends, for 
entirely independent reasons, also to bring about r. In knock-oncases the agent brings 
about p because of p’s tendency to lead to q and in spite of q’s tendency to lead to r. 
In branching cases it is an open question whether q or r is more probable. In knock-
on cases it is not: because the instantiation of the proposition accepted is structurally 
dependent on the instantiation of the proposition aimed at, the agent’s bringing about 
of the latter cannot, for obvious reasons, be more probable than his bringing about 
of the former. put concisely: although there are no structural determinants of the 
relative probabilities of an end and the consequences of ways or means of achieving 
that end, the consequences of an end are necessarily no more probable than is the 
achievement of that end.
For these reasons, we may frequently be justified in seeing the agent as less 
culpable for bringing about some merely accepted consequences of what he is aiming 
at than for achieving his aim. however, any lessening in culpability here depends 
entirely on the agent’s subjective probabilities, not on any intrinsic features of the 
two optative attitudes themselves. This is only brought out by considering cases 
in which the agent assigns exactly the same likelihood to both results, a condition 
that is most obviously fulfilled where the agent assigns the coming into being of r, 
if q comes about, a probability of one. For instance, only when the deaths of the 
schoolchildren are taken to be strictly unavoidable if the munitions depot is bombed 
does the contrast between the two bombers get to the attitudinal heart of the matter. 
As long as the example allows some probability of the children escaping death 
when the bomb is dropped, we have a difference in subjective probabilities that can 
mobilize justifiable responsibility-theoretic intuitions. Subtract these, however, and 
the case for the pCC(R) dissolves.
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5. Acceptance and justification
In spite of the fact that the ‘doctrine of double effect’ is officially formulated in terms 
of permissibility, many of the intuitions that give it force are best understood in terms 
of the pCC(R). however, once the responsibility-theoretic variant of the principle 
has been rejected, we are left with a claim that really just is about permissibility. 
In order to evaluate this claim, shorn of considerations of attribution, we need to 
return to the structure characterized in 1.4: the idea of a prohibition’s normative 
relaxation independent of the justification of that relaxation by other moral norms 
that override the prohibition. If this is indeed the structure for which we are seeking 
an explanation, the question we are faced with is whether there is plausibly any room 
for such non-justificatory normative relaxation within an acceptable morality.
5.1 Normative relaxation and justification
This question appears particularly acute once absolutism is rejected. If it is not 
postulated that there are certain actions that could under no circumstances be justified, 
then it seems a reasonable hypothesis that the judgements that appear to be explained 
by the PCC(N) might be reconstructed in terms of the justified overriding of strong 
prohibitions in the light of other moral norms. A non-absolutist morality plausibly 
contains a strong prohibition on killing. Nevertheless, an agent is both morally and 
legally permitted to cause another person’s death where doing so is required for 
self-defence. Similarly, for any morality that is not strictly pacifist, certain forms 
of killing are permitted in war. And medical practitioners are also permitted under 
certain circumstances to cause their patient’s deaths. In a non-absolutist morality, the 
reasons for these permissions are naturally seen as grounding in normsthatjustify
thecausationofdeathunderanotherdescription: as defending oneself, waging war 
under certain circumstances and relieving a patient’s pain.
In order to make clear the lines of the debate, it is important to note that a view of 
this kind does not necessarily depend on ‘consequentialism’, if consequentialism is 
the doctrine that valid norms are justified in terms of the consequences of their being 
obeyed. The rejection of absolutism is perfectly compatible with the justification 
of norms taking other forms, for instance, Kantian universalization. Whether, for 
instance, there are valid norms of fairness that are not justifiable in terms of their 
consequences is a question that is completely independent of whether such norms 
are necessarily to be accorded lexical priority. This point is obscured by Anscombe’s 
original characterization of consequentialism as encompassing any moral theory that 
rejects absolutism (Anscombe 1958, 34–6).19
put in the easily misleading terms of ‘ends’: the absolutist defender of the pCC(N) 
claims that there are some actions that no ends can justify, whereas the pCC(N)’s 
non-absolutist advocate claims that there are some actions that, in the contexts under 
scrutiny, no ends justify. In both claims the relevant ‘ends’ encompass the realization 
of competing moral norms, however these are themselves justified. Both defenders of 
the PCC(N) claim that the actions in question can nevertheless be morally acceptable 
19  It is also easily obscured by Kant’s own absolutism.
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under specific attitudinal conditions. If this is correct, then the challenge that has to 
be met by the defender of the pCC(N) therefore does not concern the acceptability of 
non-consequentialist reasons for moral norms, but the acceptability of a relaxation of 
normative stringency in spite of the lack of an appropriate justification by reference 
to further moral norms.
But once one subtracts the idea that the relevant relaxation could be a consequence 
of the reduced attributability of the action’s prohibited result, the challenge, when 
characterized in this way, looks to be unmeetable. Why should we relax a prohibition 
if there is no justification for doing so? Moreover, taking this claim together with our 
analysis of what it is to aim at one component of a package leads to absurd results. 
Remember that, in such a case, intending to bring about p rather than q is a matter of 
taking the prospect of bringing about the former proposition as the reason for one’s 
overall stand, that is, it is a matter of seeing the prospect of p as justifying opting 
for (p and q). But if the PCC(N) does indeed spell out a principle of non-justified 
relaxation of a prohibition, then the following must be true: seeing the prospect of p 
as justifying also opting to bring about q must relax the prohibition on bringing about 
q without justifying bringing about q. That is, the normative relaxation would have 
to result from the falsity of the agent’s perspective, according to which the prospect 
of p justifies also opting to bring about q. This would make the normative relaxation 
specified by the PCC(N) dependent on the agent’s false belief in the existence of a 
justificatory relation. This would be a bizarre construction indeed.
Of course, it might be thought that this result is an artefact of a tendentious 
characterization of the central idea of the pCC(N). perhaps what it aims to establish 
is incorrectly characterized as moral acceptability minus justifiability. The PCC(N) 
is, after all, a normative principle and ought perhaps therefore to be understood as 
itself providing a kind of justification, if a somewhat unusual one. Thus understood, 
it would stipulate that a person’s opting for a compound proposition because she 
takes the prospect of one of its components to justify opting thus, functions as a 
justification for bringing about a second, otherwise forbidden component of her 
optative attitude’s content. 
There are two reasons why this cannot be right. One, it is implausible that an 
action’s justifiability might be determined by the agent’s taking it to be justified. 
Of course, where someone contravenes a norm in good faith, believing wrongly 
that there are considerations which justify that contravention, we may well hold the 
person less responsible for doing so than if the offence is a result of purely egoistic 
motives. But this would be an application of a mitigating principle of attribution, not 
of a justificatory principle.
Two, the doctrine thus understood would appear to be systematically dependent 
on moral agents adopting the very perspective it rejects. Where an agent takes 
the prospect of bringing about p to justify his opting for (p and q), in spite of the 
problematic character of bringing about q, he must have some reason for seeing 
things this way. Where we are dealing with examples that fall under conflicting 
moral norms, it is natural to assume that that reason refers to what the agent sees as 
the stronger justificatory power of a norm prescribing the bringing about of p than 
one condemning the bringing about of q. For instance, it appears that the reason why 
the collateral bomber pilot opts to bring about the children’s deaths as part of the 
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package would have to be his belief that the prescription to end the war outweighs 
the prohibition on killing the children. But it is beliefs of this kind that the PCC(N) 
is supposed to be rejecting. In other words, if the PCC(N) is a correct justificatory 
principle, the justifiability of the agent’s resolution of the moral dilemma looks like 
it would have to be dependent on him being wrong about the justifiability issue. 
A theory that claimed this would not be self-contradictory. however, it would 
demand contradictory normative stances from moral agents and the moral theorist. 
Ironically, this is the very dissociation of practical and theoretical perspectives 
that ‘deontologists’ have frequently, and not implausibly, objected to in two-level 
utilitarian theories.
There is one last possibility open to the advocate of a justificatory understanding 
of the PCC(N). This would be to treat the justificatory path recommended by the 
principle as self-referential. In this version, the agent opting for (p and q), in spite 
of the prohibition of bringing about q, would do so not because he takes some norm 
recommending p to outweigh a norm proscribing q. Instead, he would opt as he does 
because he takes his opting for that reason to justify his action, including its various 
unpalatable consequences. The action would be justified by the attitudinal stance 
according to which it is justified by that same attitudinal stance.
This suggestion would avoid the inconsistency of the previous proposal. But in 
doing so, it would be all the more obviously subject to the objection that taking some 
behaviour to be justified does nothing to guarantee its justification. A moral norm 
which prescribed intentions that are about themselves would be directing agents 
to take what they take to be justificatory, rather than properties of their actions, as 
justificatory. It is difficult to see how what is called ‘justification’ here could be 
recognized as a form of justification at all.
5.2Attitudeevaluation
Throughout this discussion I have assumed that moral norms prescribe, prohibit 
or permit actions, that is, intentional bringings about of (static or dynamic) 
states of affairs.20 The investigation of the ‘doctrine of double effect’ concerns 
the question of whether we have reason to accept permissions of actions – or a 
principle of diminished responsibility for norm contraventions – on the basis of 
a specific attitudinal constellation on the part of the action’s agent. The result of 
this investigation is that we do not. however, this does not entail that we have no 
reason to accept moral norms for the evaluation of agent’s attitudes. We certainly 
do so and there is a simple reason why we should: our understanding of a person’s 
attitudinal constitution, in particular of her motivational constitution, is the decisive 
factor in our estimation of how she is likely to act in morally relevant contexts.21 
20  “Intentional” is here, of course, not equivalent to “intended”.
21  There is also a logical reason why motive evaluation is necessarily secondary relative 
to action evaluation: a motive is necessarily a motive to perform a specific type of action, 
that is, we need to specify an action type in order to individuate a motive in the first place. A
fortiori, we need to specify a morally problematic action type in order to individuate a morally 
problematic motive.
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What is of particular significance for our topic is the possibility of a gap opening 
up between our normative stance towards an agent’s action and our stance towards 
the attitudinal constellation responsible for that action. There are cases in which, 
although someone has adhered faultlessly to the moral norms relevant for her action, 
we may nevertheless, in spite of condoning her action, also criticize the motives 
behind it. Under such circumstances, the positive evaluation of what the person does 
is tempered by the negative evaluation of an attitudinal set which disposes her, under 
conditions close to the one under scrutiny, to morally unacceptable behaviour.22
In such cases the PCC(N) picks out a particular kind of attitudinal constellation 
for condemnation and conflates this attitudinal evaluation with the evaluation of the 
action it causes. It registers, for instance, that the attitudes of the ‘teleological’ bomber 
are at least primafaciemore dubious than those of his ‘collateralist’ counterpart. It 
then moves illicitly from this judgement about the agents’ attitudes to a judgement 
about their respective actions. However, not only should the conflation of the two 
levels of evaluation be avoided. Differentiation among the attitudinal features of 
agents that may merit moral criticism reveals that the distinction between intention 
and acceptance has no special status on this level either.23
In order to see this it is important to compare cases in which the difference between 
intention and acceptance is not manifested in – however minimal – differences in the 
agent’s actions. particularly where we are dealing with complex, temporally extended 
actions, such cases may be difficult to describe plausibly. Someone who intends 
to bring about p will, as is emphasized by downstream conceptions of intention, 
typically (if not necessarily) devise ways of bringing about p and endeavour to do so. 
If this leads to fine adjustments in the action of the teleological bomber that are not 
present in the case of his collateral counterpart, then we are judging different actions 
and we do not need the pCC(N) to tell us what is wrong.
If, on the other hand, we restrict the objects of moral evaluation to agents’ attitudinal 
constellations, there is no intrinsic reason for seeing intentions to contravene norms as 
morally worse than acceptances of one’s doing so. Certainly, if someone has thought 
things through and opted to go for a morally problematic action, that tells more 
strongly against him than if he is merely the bearer of a corresponding desire, which 
he may be able to resist. Moreover, if he opts for a package deal, only reluctantly 
accepting certain morally prohibited consequences, then we will generally find his 
attitudinal configuration less morally unpalatable than if he takes the prospect of 
those consequences as the reason for his action. Nevertheless, we need to bear in 
mind that the acceptance of collateral consequences need by no means be reluctant. 
The fact that someone does not see the prospect of certain morally problematic 
consequences as the decisive reason for his action in some situation s1 is perfectly 
compatible with his being disposed to take their prospect as such a decisive reason 
in closely related situations s2, s3 … sn. Where an acceptance is a welcoming of 
collateral consequences, or derives from indifference to them, it may express a more 
dubious overall attitudinal constellation than an intention. The fact that the collateral 
22  David McCarthy calls this a “mismatch” between first- and second-order morality. 
see McCarthy 2002, 629, 634–9.
23  This point is made forcefully by McCarthy in the aforementioned article.
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bomber acts as he does because he happens to believe that destroying the munitions 
depot is the best military option does not exclude his readiness to intend to kill as 
many children as might turn out to be necessary. he may not care about the children 
in the slightest. In fact, there is nothing in scenario (iii) that excludes him being a 
sadist who acts for military reasons, whilst positively revelling in the destruction of 
innocent lives he also happens to be causing. his teleological counterpart, on the 
other hand, may only have decided to kill the children after agonizing about how to 
reconcile his belief that this is the only way to end the war with his moral aversion 
to doing such a deed.24 Thus it may be the case that there are far more circumstances 
under which the collateral bomber would be prepared to kill the children than there 
are circumstances under which this is true of his teleological counterpart.
Because taking some consideration as the decisive reason for action in one 
situation is frequently an indication of the propensity to do so in similar situations, 
intentions are important objects of the moral evaluation of agents’ attitudinal sets. 
however, as indicators of such counterfactual tendencies, they are not necessarily 
superior to acceptances. Clearly then, although the pCC(N) draws on valid intuitions 
concerning the moral importance of agents’ attitudinal sets, it not only conflates the 
primary norms of action evaluation with the secondary norms for the evaluation of 
attitudes, it also misrepresents the latter.
6. The double failure
The principle of collateral consequences, the attitudinally based core principle of 
the so-called doctrine of double effect, should, I conclude, be rejected: no intrinsic 
moral significance attaches to the distinction between intending and accepting. 
The reconstruction of the intuitions that invest it with moral import suggests that 
they may be given form by one of two versions of the principle, where the first 
is responsibility-theoretic and the second, closer to the official wording of the 
‘doctrine’, normative in the narrow sense. In the light of the upstream analysis of the 
distinction between intending and accepting the conjoins of a compound intention, 
the pCC fails to convince in both variants.
The intuitions behind the PCC(R) are not difficult to articulate: where an agent 
takes the prospect of bringing about p to justify his opting to bring about (p and q), 
this tends to correlate with a lower subjective probability of his bringing about the 
collateral consequence q. This fact, not its dependence on the intention/acceptance 
distinction, may justify seeing some norm contravention on the part of the agent as 
less attributable to him.
In contrast, when the pCC is construed in terms of permissibility, its status and 
rationale become considerably more difficult to fathom. In an attempt to do so, two 
interpretations of the normative version of the principle were discussed. According 
to the first, the principle stipulates the normative relaxation of a prohibition in spite 
of the lack of a justification of the action thus allowed; according to the second, the 
24  Indeed, acquiring the intention to kill the children is compatible with failing to carry 
it out as a result of weakness of will.
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PCC(N) is a normative principle that justifies the action in the standard manner. The 
first reading makes the relaxation of the prohibition dependent on a false justificatory 
perspective on the part of the agent. The second either makes the exception to the 
prohibition dependent on the validity of justificatory mechanisms the PCC(N) is 
supposed to supplant, or else makes the agent’s justificatory perspective self-
referential. In the former variant the pCC(N) becomes redundant; in the latter it loses 
all appearance of being an account of justification. The most plausible explanation of 
the PCC(N) seems to lie in a conflation of action evaluations and attitude evaluations. 
Even here, however, the distinction between intention and acceptance need not be 
morally decisive.25
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